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JURISDICTION: Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(d). This case should be addressed by 
the Supreme Court because: 1) it deals with improprieties on the 
part of the Defendant's lawyers; 2) it deals with bias on the part 
of the Trial Court judge: 3) it deals with issues of first impression 
in the state and each issue is of substantial importance in the ad-
ministration of justice in Utah. Re: Utah R. App„ P. Rule 9 (c7B); 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: Plaintiff (Theresa F. Thompson) 
requests that the whole case be reviewed with careful attention to: 1) 
whether or not Defendant's lawyers informed Defendant that false testamony 
to the EEOC would be protected by absolute privilege. (The Defendant 
knew about absolute privilege and used it in planning its response to the 
EEOC and violated all laws against false testamony both State and Federal. 
The ease with which the testamony can be proven false and the fact that 
it was admitted at the hearing indicates a prior knowledge of protection 
through absolute privilege. (Standard of Review—Section 78-51-31— 
Deceit and Collusion); 2) whether or not Defendant's defensive 
arguments apply to the Plaintiff's charges or to charges created by 
Defendant with atatements life: "What Plaintiff is really attempting 
to do is..." (Standard of Review—Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 1, 4) 
and Section 78-51-26(4)—Duties of Attorneys and Counselors...to employ 
for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided to him such means 
only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the 
judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law; 3) whether or 
not the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can be determined to be 
quasi-judicial according *-^  Utah Code. (Standard of Review—Comparison 
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of regulations governing EEOC officials and procedures with Utah 
Codes governing judges, lawyers, procedures and quasi-judicial officials 
(court commissioners); 4) whether or not absolute privilege can be 
claimed if the statements made in a potentially quasi-judicial proceeding 
have nothing to do with duty and in no way promote public welfare (both 
requirements by definition), (Standard of Review—Black's Law Dictionary); 
5) whether common law (absolute privilege) in violation of statutory 
law (laws against false testimony) takes precedence over statutory law 
or whether statutory law takes precedence over common law. (Standard of 
Review—Utah R. App. P. Rule 9(c7B). 
Issues 1 and 2 above are intrinsic to the manner in which the trial court 
case was conducted and to the information presented to the EEOC in the course 
of an official proceeding. The misconduct and criminal behavior of Mr. O'Brien 
will be proven in the argument section of this brief. The intrinsic nature 
of this issues is preserved in the trial court records. Issues 3, 4 and 5 
are matters of law that need to be determined for fair administration of law 
and are matters that need to be determined by the Supreme Court. These matters 
are basic to the determination of the trial court case. 
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6. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL: 
Constitution of Utah, Article 1, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, Sec. 15. Freedom 
of speech and of the press—Libels 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech 
or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth 
may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the 
jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, tne party shall be 
acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law 
and the fact. 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE: 
Section 76-8-502: A person is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree if in any official proceeding; 1) He makes a false material 
statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth 
of a material statement previously made and he does not believe the 
statement to be true; or 2) He makes inconsistent material statements 
under oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, 
one of which is false and not believed by him to be true. In a 
prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or proved 
which of the statements is false but only that one or the other was 
false and not believed by the defendant to be true. (False or in-
consistent material statements^ 
76-8-503. False or inconsistent statements. A person is guilty of 
a class B misdemeanor if: 1) He makes a false statement under oath 
or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of the statement pre-
viously made and he does not believe the statement to be true if: 
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(a) The falsification occurs in an official proceeding, or is made 
with a purpose to mislead a public servant in performing his official 
functions; or (b) The statement is one which is required by law to 
be sworn or affirmed before a notoary or other person authorized to 
administer oaths; or (2) He makes inconsistent statements under oath 
or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of which 
is false and not believed by him to be true. In a prosecution 
under this section, it need not be alleged or proved which of the 
statements is false but only that one or the other was false and 
not believed by the defendant to be true. (3) No person shall be 
guilty under this section if he retracts the falsification before 
it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed. 
76-8-504. Written false statement. A person is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor if: (1) He makes a written false statement...(not 
applicable to this case) : or (2) with intent to deceive a public 
servant in the performance of his official function, he: (a) Makes 
any written false statement which he does not believe to be true: 
JUDICIAL CODE: 
78-51-31. Deceit and collusion. An attorney and counselor who is 
guitly of deceit or collusion, or who sonsents thereto, with intent 
to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding 
is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party 
treble damages to be recovered in a civil action. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners—Qualifications—appointment— 
Functions governed by rule. (1) (a) Court commissioners are quasi-
judicial officers of courts of record and have judicial authority 
as provided by this section and rules of the Judicial Council, 
(b) (must be lawyers but may not practice law during tenure as 
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Court commissioners—Section 78-7-2); (2) (a) (appointed by 
Judicial Council with concurrence of majority of judges of trial 
courts in the district commissioner will primarily serve.); (3) 
(qualifications); (4) (oath of office); (5) Court commissioners 
shall: (a) comply with applicable constitutional and statutory 
provisions, court rules and procedures, and rules of the Judicial 
Council; (b) comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same 
extent as full-time judges; and (c) successfully complete orientation 
and education programs as required by the Judicial Council. 
(6) (what functions commissioner may and may not perform); 
(7) The presiding judge of the district the commissioner primarily 
serves: (a) shall develop a performance plan for the court commis-
sioner and annually conduct an evaluation of the commissioner's 
performance, and shall provide the plan and evaluations to the 
judicial Council upon request; and (b) is responsible for the day-
to-day supervision of the court commissioner. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
Rule 1. General provisions . (a) Scope of rules They shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
Part III PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS, (summary of the presentation 
of a case to a court—complaint, answer, motions with memorandum 
in support of motion, and counter-motions with memorandum in sup-
port of such motions, possible hearings and requests for decisions.) 
(Every action is an attempt to get to the truth of the matter and 
every party has the right to address every issue that is brought up) 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT: 
CANON I. A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
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OF THE JUDICIARY. An independent and honorable judiciary is in-
dispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate 
in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and shall personally 
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and in-
dependence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of 
this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. 
CANONS 2-5 (summary—judges shall avoid impropriety and the 
appearance of impropriety in all activities, shall perform the duties 
of the office impartially and diligently and shall do nothing that 
might make anyone lose faith in the judicial system, shall so conduct 
the judge's extra-judicial activities as to minimize the risk of 
conflict with judicial obligations, and shall refrain from political 
activity inappropriate to the judicial office.) 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
Scope. The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. 
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal 
representation and of the law itself, (summary of rules—the rules 
control client-lawyer relationships, the role of counselor, 
advocate with many shall nots such as shall not deliberately mis-
lead a tribunal, transactions with persons other than clients, 
public service, etc. It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 
through the acts of another;) 
42 U.S.C.A.section 2000e-9 (Re: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) 
1. Purpose: In amending this subchapter to give Commission 
authority to conduct investigations of charges of employment 
discrimination and to enforce orders where it was determined 
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that discrimination existed, Congress intended to simplify investigations, 
rather than complicate them with protracted pleadings and motions, in order 
to remove burdens that had been placed upon both courts and parties. EEOC 
V. Suburban Transit System, Inc. N. D. Ill 1982, 538 F. Supp. 530. 
**************************************************** 
Definition of absolute privilege from Black's Law Dictionarty: 
An exemption from liability for the speaking ( libelous statements) 
in the performance of a duty...(absolute) privilege...protects the 
speaker or publisher without reference to his motives or the truth 
or falsity of statement. This may be claimed in respect to state-
ments made in legislative debates, in reports of military officers 
to their superiors in the line of duty and statements made by judges, 
witnesses, and jurors in trials in court...based on the fact that 
the statement was made in the performance of a political, judicial, 
social or personal duty...privileges created by law irrespective of 
consent...arise where there is some important overriding social 
value in sanctioning defendant's conduct, despite the fact that it 
causes plaintiff harm, 
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7. A STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
Plaintiff received 2 years of harrassment by Community Nursing Service, 
was fired, and filed a complaint with the EEOC because of harrassment and 
retaliation. The Defendant presented false testimony to the EEOC in violation 
of the law, and the Plaintiff having no way to anticipate this action on the 
part of her former employers was thrown into severe stress that sent Plaintiff 
to Logan Regional hospital with intractible abdoemenal pain and migraine 
headache for 9 days followed by 3 week recovery period* I filed a civil 
suit for severe physical and emotional stress for false testimony. The false 
testimony is described in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Complaint, but I labeled 
it as defamation for brevity's sake when I referred to it elsewhere believing 
that when you presented false testimony against some one you are defaming 
them, (page 3) 
CNS/H's defense was that absolute privilege prevented any charges from 
being brought against them, (page 136) 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick agreed. 
Mr. O'Brien (CNS/H's lawyer) continuously tried to deceive and mislead 
the judge through lies (telling the judge the essential issue filed with 
the EEOC was termination (page 42) when the essential issue filed with EEOC 
was clearly a two-year history of harrassment (pages 67-73)) and half truths 
(page 38)/ 0 c;ear;u cjarged tjat 0 was severely harmed mentally and physically 
by half truths and outright lies (page 3). I want the case reviewed for mis-
conduct on the part of Mr. O'Brien leading to defenses that did not apply to 
some of my charges. 
Judge Fredericks conduct during the hearing was a violation of Rules of 
Judicial Conduct (pages 187-189). He made a decision on an untimely motion 
by Defendant, signed an order before Plaintiff knew about the motion, rescinded 
the order upon objection from Plaintiff, then reaffirmed it without further 
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information from Defendant, (page 134—untimely motion, page 141—hasty 
decision, page 148-9—order signed by judge with signature erased, page 150— 
order setting aside hasty decision—please note #1—the reason it was set 
aside, page 154—reaffirmed the hasty decision with no new information from 
defendant*) Plaintiff contends that this indicates bias on part of judge. 
Plaintiff further contends that the criterion upon which the EEOC is 
determined to be a quasi-judicial body is arbitrary and that there are no 
regulations in place controlling the use of its powers to insure or attempt 
to insure a just and fair decision by the EEOC. The result is a statement 
that truthful or false testimony is protected by absolute privilege (page 39) 
When a decision is based on false testimony, the decision has to be unjust. 
It is for this court to decide whether or not justice is served by granting 
the status of quasi-judicial to the EEOC. We are not discussing whether 
or not my feelings and reputation were hurt by the Defendant saying bad 
but truthful things about me, but whether justice was served by the EEOC 
investigation and decision based on false testamony being given to the 
EEOC by Defendant in violation of the law. Was the severe physical and 
emotional harm caused by testimony that should never have appeared in the 
investigation (which I charged) defamation or an attempt to create a 
defamation liability or properly a Tort of Outrage based on false testimony? 
Finally this Court needs to decide if absolute privilege creates a right to 
present false testimony before an official proceeding to manipulate the 
decision of that proceeding.. 
************************************************** 
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8. Summary of arguments 
1. The EEOC should not be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding or body 
based on the current criterion because the current criterion is arbitrary 
and has no criterion that insures or attempts to insure a fair and just 
determination. In the current status of the EEOC, absolute privilege creates 
a right to present false testimony to manipulate an official decision and 
mislead the investigators. At least the judge at the trial court level 
decided this was so. A better criterion would be a comparison of judicial 
procedures and regulations with similar characteristics of an EEOC investi-
gation. This is so because judicial procedures and regulations attempt to 
insure a fair opportunity to all participants to address all issues in order 
that a fair and equitable decision can be made by the judiciary. 
2. Absolute privilege cannot protect false testimony from defamation, criminal 
or tort of outrage charges. According to the Utah State Constitution, Article 
I, Section 15. Statements that are libelous must also be truthful, published 
with good motives and for justifiable ends in order for the person guilty to 
be acquited. Even though Judge Frederick found in Defendant's favor, Mr. 
O'Brien never proved that absolute privilege protected false testimony as 
will be shown in the arguments. 
3. Plaintiff contends that Mr. O'Brien is guilty of deceit and collusion 
and misconduct throughout these proceedings. The easei with which the 
testimony can be proven false and contradictory indicates a prior knowledge 
or belief in immunity from prosecution. Plaintiff contends that the knowledge 
came from Mr. O'Brien. Also Mr. O'Brien has consistently and continually 
attempted to deceive and mislead the trial court as to what the charges were* 
rules, procedures, definitions and has applied defenses that do not apply to 
charges as will be shown in the body of the argument. 
4. Judge Frederick was biased against the Plaintiff as evidenced by his 
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behavior and attitude towards Plaintiff at the hearing (pages 187-190) 
and his handling of some post-judgment motions and papers 
described in the body of the argument, (pages 134, 141, 143, 148, 149, 150, 
154), 
**************************************************************************** 
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ARGUMENTS 
!o Argument against Equal Employment Opportunity Commission being granted 
quasi-judicial status and absolute privilege of statements made in its in-
vestigations . 
In Thomas v. Petrulis (465 N.E. 2d 1059 111. App. 2 pist. 1984) Six 
powers are listed as differentiating a quasi-judicial body from that perform-
ing merely an administrative function (page 51): 
1) the power to exercise judgment and discretion; 2) the power to 
hear and determine determine or to ascertain facts and decide; 3) the 
power to make binding orders and judgments: 4) the power to affect 
the personal or property rights of private persons; 5) the power to 
examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnesses, and to hear 
the litigation of the issues on a hearing' and 6) the power to enforce 
decisions or impose penalties. 
Plaintiff would like to point out that among these six powers is not 
one characteristic, element or power that does anything to insure or attempt 
to insure a fair and just determination. There is nothing here to guarantee 
that the investigator does try to use discretion, or ascertain fact from 
falsity, or that a witness will be examined rather than the passive recording 
of testimony without challenge to its veracity or allowing its veracity to 
be challenged. 
These powers without regulations to insure a fair and equitable decision 
leads to statements like: "Thus assuming arguendo (for the purpose of 
this motion only) that the factual basis of her claim is true, (1. severe 
physical and emotional harm caused by false testimony, 2. defamation of 
character—added by Plaintiff) Plaintiff plainly seeks to impose defamation 
liability for statements that are absolutely privileged because they were 
allegedly made during the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding." 
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(page 39) and "Of course an absolute privilege means there is no cause of 
action regardless of whether the statement at issue is true or false." 
(Page 42) 
But the Utah State Constitution Article I, section 15 says it does 
make a difference * Article 15 says: No law shall be passed to abridge or 
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions 
for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be 
acquited: and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the 
fact. 
None of these were met by CNS/Hfs statements to the EEOC. They presented 
false testimony, without good faith and for the purpose of manipulating an 
official commission in the performance of duty. (The proof will be given 
under the argument for misconduct of the lawyer.) 
The intrinsic falseness and self-contradictory nature of the testimony 
is a violation of criminal Code sections 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and 76-8-504. 
Inspite of these violations of the State Constitution and statutory laws$ 
Judge Frederick decided in Defendant's favor, " for reasons specified in sup-
porting memorandum." (page 98) 
In conclusion, from the foregoing statements, the basis upon which the 
EEOC has been determined to be quasi-judicial is arbitrary and_abrog4tes 
any possibitity of a fair and just decision. 
An equally valid but more equitable criterion in that it would insure 
or at least attempt to insure a fair and just decision would be to compare 
the regulations that control the powers of both the judiciary and the EEOC. 
In the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1 it says: Scope of rules... 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
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determination of every action,, A statement conparable to this statement af 
Opportunity • '"iw; iss ion ;, • amending rn s si,nchapter 10 give 
Commission authority • M''"" ' * *"*&<=+ , ,,**• * - ,.« t charge*- ^f ^mpl'wment dis-
crimination and to e' • - * : *n 
existed, Congress intended to simplify investigations, rather than conplicate 
them with protracted pleadings and motions, in <. rder t - --tn—> Ni-^rs that 
had been placed upon both courts and parties, * *i: v. Suburban iransit 
System, Inc. N.D. 111.1982, 538 F. Supp, 530. 
c
 ( -otracted pleadings and 
motions? 
According to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Part III Pleadings, Motions 
and Orders . (si immar5 of the presentation * • i •  ~ * coup] aint, 
answers, motions with memorandum in suppc - " vtions. counter-motions with 
memorandum supporting them, heari ngs and requests for decisions—Every action 
is an attempt to get to the truth :: f the matter and every party has the i::i ght 
address every issue that is brought up.) 
Eliminating the pleadi ngs and motions means that all issues will probabbly 
not be adtessed'by everyone which is what happened to Plaintiff 1 was not 
allowed to know what information was presented by CNS/H to the EEOC except 
i ill I I n in in in i i f p i n • i in 1 n in \ ^ f Let me 
know that CNS/H had lied . »• 3^lv< -, «,., <_ .^  ... . * -e the in-
formation was false, The investigator said if I thought the information was 
i<: make -j decision against me (M&ttu uu Lai^j u- -. .mt••> , 
The decision o* HIP mdop in MSH tn if r^< 'v, ^p^n nreviou«Oy discussed. 
Code, *h* '^  * Jinai Conduct and Rule:* "^ Professional Conduct. The 
Code of Judical o< .i^ t- ^tato^ th-i indpe shall upheld f.he integrity and 
a judge shall and shall not do to uphold the integrity and independence of the 
judiciary. Under the Judicial Code J3~3-31 are listed the qualifications, 
appointment and functions of Court Commissioners, quasi-judicial officials 
of the Court. Under 78-3-31 (5a-b) Court Commissions shall: comply with 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, court rules and procedures, 
and rules of the Judicial Council: comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct 
to the same extent as full-time judges. 
Finally there are the Rules of Professional Conduct which set bounds on 
the behavior of lawyers such as Rule 3.3—(a lawyer) shall not deliberately 
mislead a tribunal. All of these Codes and regulations are aimed at fair and 
equitable decisions by the Court. There are no such regulations in the EEOC 
which is why decisions like I received are made. To compound the problem, 
The EEOC has been improperly classified as quasi-judicial with absolute pri-
vilege. When false testimony is classified as defamation and protected by 
absolute privilege, there is no possibility of a fair and just decision. 
There are three possible solutions based on the information presented, 
1) determine that the EEOC is not quasi-judicial nor is the testimony privi-
leged by anything but the State Constitution; 2) that the EEOC is quasi-
judicial but that testimony only has partial privilege; 3) that the EEOC 
is quasi-judicial, has absolute privilege, but that false testimony, a violation 
of both the State Constitution and statutory law is not, can not and was 
never intended to be protected by absolute privilege. 
Plaintiff wants any decision that makes Defendant responsible for 
their false testimony (a violation of the law) and the severe consequesces to 
the Plaintiff. This charge was not at any time an attempt to create a de-
famation liability regardless of whatever mistakes I made in attempting 
to label facts. 
The relief Plaintiff asks for the extreme harm caused to her by Defendants 
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violation ci >*- •' ^  .'• 1 ° ,000 ,000 (r.we 1 \re mi i 1 i ,*n • I lars). 
2., • - w - statutory law 'false testimonyx ^-nild take precedence over 
c ii I iw ^absolute privilep~* 
Re: State Constitution : , sei * ion lb ,,.a 1 
appear to * h<~ * ^ * <s ue matter charged as libelous is true, 
, . „.. J ^ ^ £ _ J I - - ^ o nu~l^ lX - -. - *,,j fci justifiable ends, 
t he parr v -?ha 11 be. acquited . . • 
Re: Utah Criminal Codes: Section 76_~8~502 — A person is guilty of 
f ' r -' oceeding: 1) 
he tnaKes u i -J J o^ m,i ferial ^tatemen! . ,2) he makes inconsistent 
mat^r ial statements,.• 
K f
"
l De(
-
 L l1 ;
 i / o - o - J * • -;- _1''snleailer 
1
 ma ke s a false state;- ' - h t • rna K ^  s L n euns i s tent 
statements, ,. 
Re: Section . o-s-p'-- •> -
4 - written fa Is*1 statement • h 
to deceive a public servant xii cue performance of uis official 
Re - -1 . tion of absolute privilege from Blackfs Law Diction* 
Libeo. ~i-, .ariiic i - . >tion from udDiiiLy JUJL Lne e^enk^n^ 
' ~f 'ih^In'S statement: thp performance of a dutv... 
privilege... .protects the speaker or publisher without reference to 
or falsity of statement. This may be claimed 
if) lespek-t . •-• ocat^iiK-nts ma.de in legislative debates, in reports of 
iTiiiitwrv !nhrers' t .-> their superiors in the li UP of duty and state-
ait-n sses , and 
based • • -i tact tnat tne. statement was made in. the performance of 
in 
a political, judicial, social or personal duty...privileges created 
by law irrespective of consent...arise where there is some important 
orriding social value in sanctioning defendant's conduct, despite 
the fact that it causes plaintiff harm. 
Obviously, from a comparison of the Utah Constitution Article I Section 
15, the statutory laws against false testimony and absolute privilege, there 
is a direct conflict. Absolute privilege abrogates the Constitutional and 
statutory provissions that assure justice in an official proceeding. 
Absolute privilege is based upon the public interest in according to 
all men the utmost freedom of access to the Courts of justice for the settle-
ment of their private disputes." Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 
587-588 (1?77) (hereafter cited as Restatement) The privilege broadly applies 
to any sort of judicial or administrative proceeding, in any branches of 
government, where a type of judicial function is performed." Id. at sec 585. 
(page 40) 
The purpose is to accord access to the courts of justice with their 
rules and regulations to insure justice. The problems with the broad appli-
cation of absolute privilege is the elimination of justice as described under 
argument about the EEOC. 
However, is absolute privilege suppose to protect one from the consequences 
of violating the law. Plaintiff thinks not. 
Restatement section 588 states: A witness is absolutely privileged 
to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications pre-
liminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as part of a judicial 
proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has some relation to the 
proceeding, (page 40) 
According to the State Constitution, these statements must be true, 
published with good motives, and for justifiable ends. Also this testimony 
will be given under oath where the witness swears to tell the truth. It is 
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assumed that the testimony although libelous is truthful, not false testimony. 
Utah Code Ann., section 45-2-3(2) states: A privileged publication or 
broadcast which shal 1, not be considered as libelous or slanderous per 
se, is one made: (2) In any publication, or broadcast of or any state-
merit made in any legislative or judicial proceeding, or in an:;) other 
official proceeding authorized by law*, (page 40) 
This simp 1xi c-^ < t- h M viiaf i <• < * i  H m ~tu\? 'poiplar M * P , ixjidi c i a I r her 
official ,-<>.-. 
not say one car; lie ihout: what was said* 
In Allen v. Ortez 802 P. 2d 1307 (Utah 1990) (hereafter referred to as 
Allen) the Utah Supreme Court relied on both the Restatement Prosseras dis-
cussed above and stated: One of the absolute privileges (from, defamation) 
i1!1 I'll!1! ;>i,iiil il I | M i t 11" J p a n l ,'i !>" i11!-1!"" r i -i l pi /r J'H»I1 i •],[»« , VP general riiU» is 
i .N ,,<.- A.'i't ii i.; igents L.^^I j n judic.di roceedings 
hflvfi an absni»i M * love ^painsf dpfamatioi *'s n n v i l e ^ e is premised 
there be free and OT en expressioi * partio ^int- and that rn:~ v i a 
0ii rt^^.t^ , < hhntT !-« nrtf ipH^Tfr, ^y the risk of subsequent defamation 
su 
]* \' a ,\ >-i ' •( i: 'he Supreme Court of Utah, is sworn to 
" " ^ " M *"h^ <?*--**•- ^'i"-^ i tut ion that this decision,, must be interpret *•* n 
i tut ion and, that the libelous statements mu. ; 
truth published 1 with good, motives and for justifiable ends, 'Plaintiff 
asks the Court to clarify this matter I n thi s decision. Defendant's lawyer 
cited this decision as' support that CNS?H fs false testimony'had absolute 
privilege.) 
necessarv successful < laim or absol.j't- privilege. .*§e-2*2"}-~ "~ ~"?t 
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These three elements must also be interpreted in the light of the State 
Constitution and statutory laws for the reasons given above. Again these 
elements refer to statements that are truthful, 'published' with good motive 
and for justifiable ends. CNS/Hfs testimony did not fit Constitutional 
requirements for privilege. Also there is the added safeguard of all 
of the rules and regulations of the judicial system for which the elements 
were described for. 
In none of the proceeding examples did Mr. O'Brien apply absolute privilege 
to quasi-judicial proceedings, Each example cited was a judicial proceeding 
regulated by specific codes and the State Constitution meant to insure a fair 
and settlement, and in each situation the testimony is given under oath and 
expected and required by law to be truthful, not false testimony. 
One quasi-judicial proceeding Mr, O'Brien cited was Thomas v. Petrulis 
(465 N.E. 2d 1059 111 App. 2 Dist. 1984) to support his contention that all 
testimony before the EEOC is protected by absolute privilege. In this particulai 
case Petrulis' charges with the EEOC are protected by absolute privilege be-
cause properly filed charges with the EEOC are protected by statutory law. 
(page 48) 
What I want to show here is the gross miscarriage of justice when absolute 
privilege protects false testimony from defamation liability, and what happens 
to the very purpose for which absolute privilege exists. For the purpose of 
argument, we will assume that Petrulis' charges with the EEOC were false and 
malicious hnd that Thomas was innocent of any harm. Perhaps he rebuffed her 
advances and she wanted to get even. The quasi-judicial system is the perfect 
way to do it. Anyone can destroy anyone else in an EEOC investigation. Any-
thing goes and the biggest liar wins. He lost his job and Petrulis got- her 
revenge with the blessings of the law. Is there any reason to take one's 
disputes to the EEOC? No, since there is no possibility of justice. 
22 
This situation is intolerable. The problem, is that the purpose of absolute 
privilege is based upon "the public interest in accord ] 1 men the ut-
most freedom of access to the Courts of justice for ^  -..-ttjement of their 
private disputes.11 Note. . ..COURTS nF JUSTICE. * .nor quasi-judicial proceedings. 
Lour t" .s I "»«' >r" • , I t d 
regulations r.;;.i every at. tempt. is made f n o-t> t a if truthful test imany 
mentioned bef^**^ *h^ T^^ K 1^ ^»^h Thomas \ I ' strulis is the problem wi th the 
EEOt!, is .liij ]< iueved lies wi th the integrity of the 
litigants and, witness, rather than with the EEOC In my case the Defendant's 
had no 'rt.p?r- t v . 
Inspire .,: . , 7 r e d e n W f s decision that false testimony before the 
EEOC is protected bv absolute privilege ' «i.ntift contends that such a 
decision is not S U . T S » > • • . ' 
Plaintiff respectfully asks L.UI.-> ^ . U - tdi*iiv -.nt- Allen, decisions 
.' • ght of tne State Constit-i" * • : ••atutor. ":iv« r make a possitive 
requirements lor libelous statements *• e privileged, * t ^  ^a*- •.', n^r. itT:--"5on 
-md ^an-t-.>.rr _ ,1ns*- ^ tr-i^hfui - M M i s h e d w u h ,^e^d m^«- ves and for 
^ 2ross inv sr . n remove the 
reason > i*-. • - private disputes ' «ua_ -rid o'a". proceedings — justice. 
Since, accord m - t - - - . nn^tiint-^p ; fbelou c statement° ^ c f be 
s 
were false ana sai.i ino w n t t e *^  nanipuiar«- i rficial investigation in 
violation. '•'' ** Pl-ir.fjrr ^ sk< * rh^ ^ ' ^ a m a M o " -? character ' -"onsidered 
a f„r i ah I n J ( ^ , on 
dollars). 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ±±i
€
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3. Argument for Mr. O'Brien's (Defendant's lawyer) misconduct and liability 
of Mr. O'Brien and his employers, JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK AND McDonough Law 
Firm 
CNS/H presented false testimony to the EEOC in order to manipulate a 
decision in their favor. The ease with which the testimony can be proven 
false and the fact that they made no effort to remove inconsistencies in-
dicates knowledge or a belief that they were immuOe to prosecution for 
their statements. Plaintiff contends that that sort of knowledge could only 
come from their lawyer. In advising CNS/H that they could violate Utah Codes 
Ann. Sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, 76-8-504 without fear of proscution, Mr. O'Brien 
violated Utah Code Ann. Sec 78-51-31 (Deceit and Collusion—An attorney and 
Counselor who is guilty of deceit and collusion, or consents thereto, 
with intent to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or proceeding 
is liable to be disbarred, and shall forfeit to the injured party treble damages 
to be recovered in a civil action-,", Plaintiff holds Mr. 0'3rien and his 
employers liable for Mr. O'Brien's conduct. 
Mr. O'Brien also violated several Codes of Professional Conduct as will 
be shown. 
The following is the account of the false testimony: 
Inconsistant Statement (76-8-503) See attached sheet—Lona Booth's testimony-
She states:. .'.'she had received many complaints about CP from patients and other 
staff, and had counseled CP on these complaints. Except for the complaints, 
CP did a good job." There were no counseling sessions between Lona Booth and 
Plaintiff which is why no such records were sent to the EEOC from Ms. Booth. 
The statement: "Except for the complaints, CP did a good job." is an incon-
sistant statement. A good worker does not get 'many complaints', and one who 
gets many complaints is not a good worker. Please compare with the attached 
complaints, none are from Ms. Booth, they are all from Susan Morgan. (Susan 
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Morgan was Plaintiff's problem at CNS/H. Please see pages 72-73) 
False or inconsistent material statements Section 76-8-502 (See attached 
sheet—testimony from Colleen Hollenbeck) Lines 7, 8 and nine say: "CP strug-
gled with her job duties from the very start of her employment. Her main 
problem was the ability to get along with patients." Please refer to Page 
4 of 'Response to Charge and Request for Information1 paragraph 1. It reads: 
On or abour December, 1991, (actually it was in May 1992) Ms. Thompson sub-
mitted an internal application requesting she be considered for weekend duty 
(actually Plaintiff was hired for weekends and worked every weekend) and 
was accepted. The position was regarded as full-time and was fully benefited. 
(I earned about $14 per visit up to 7 visits in a day and $21 for each visit 
over 7 in a day. During 1992 I earned $30,000. A lot of visits for someone 
who had problems with clients. I tried to get my records from CNS/H but couldn't 
get them.) Skills required of this position included proficiency in IV teaching 
and administration, excellence in assessment skills, and organizational skills 
to adequately coordinate delivery of care on the weekends...This was the shift 
she was working at the time of her termination in March, 19937 Ms. Colleen 
Hollenbeck, Director of Nursing in 1991 and 1992, created the weekend position 
and offered it to me. Ms. Hollenbeckfs statement is false and discredited by 
fact that she gave me a position that required excellent nursing and people 
skills. 
Inconsistant Statement (76-8-504), Refer to Page 4 of Response to Charg and 
Request for Information: Paragraph lsays I was given a job on or around December, 
1991 (less than a year after I was hired, the position was actually only in 
the thinking stage at that time) that required proficiency in...(listed above) 
and I still had that same position at the time of my termination. Paragraph 5 
says Plaintiff had a history of staff and patient complaints for which Plaintiff 
counseled. (These complaints are enclosed) 5/3/91—patient complaint (before 
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Plaintiff was assigned the newly formed weekend position, apparantly Plaintifffs 
patient skills had improved by the end of 1991.) 1/29/92 Patient complained 
of a stressful visit—patient upset because Plaintiff showed at beginning 
of yearly championship football game, (see attached sheet 1/30/92). 4/11/91 
(see letter in charge file attached to Objection to Defendant's Motion—pages 
72-73)Plaintiff was hired on 1/2/92, was not oriented until end of January, 
got so few visits over next few months had to take a second job. It is to be 
assumed Plaintiff would need to increase knowledge of home health necessary 
in personal practice. Obviously, from paragraph 1, Plaintiff acquired that 
knowledge. 8/20/92 indicated she needed to "increase assessment skills and 
admit paperwork:. The evaluation that this was on was not sent to the EEOC. 
Plaintiff still held weekend position and had excellent skills. Paragraph 6 
says "One of her supervisors, Susan Morgan, has record of verbal counseling 
for patient conplaints, interactions with peers and personal appearance issues 
on 5/3/91, 10,23/91, 12/1/91, 1/1/92, 1/30/12 and 4/18/92. Please read Plain-
tiff's charges to the EEOC against CNS/H and see where Susan Morgan fits into 
it. (pages 72-73) Susan Morgan withheld the order mentioned in the Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Reverse Judgment. 5/3/91 has already been discussed. 
10/23/91 says one nurse thought I had done something wrong, Susan said I had 
done what I was suppose*, to do. Document enclosed. 12/1/91 says Teri Thompson 
saw a patient...charting—assessment much better. Document enclosed. 1/1/92 
says a medication error had been made because of orders Plaintiff received 
from another nurse. Document enclosed. 1/30/92 has been discussed. Document 
enclosed. 4/18/92 speaks again of a stressfull visit. Susan thought that the 
patient's caregiver was stressed. Of the documents sent in support of Para-
graph 6, 2 dealt with patient conplaints, (both before I was given the week-
end position), 2 complaints in two years do not make many complaints, none 
address personal appearance of Plaintiff except one written by Susan Morgan 
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but unsigned, its enclosed. One was a complement, one explained a situation 
to Plaintiff's benefit and one had to do with a medication error. The in-
consistency between Paragraph 6 and the documents are a violation of law. 
I contend that the ease with which this testimony is proven false in-
dicates a prior knowledge of immunity to prosecution and that that knowledge 
could only come from the Defendant's lawyer. 
Mr. O'Brien (Defendant's lawyer) has continuously attempted to subvert 
and change Plaintiff/Appellantfs charges and mislead and deceive the judge as 
to the issues. Plaintiff's Complaint for Severe Financial Loss and Severe 
Emotional and Physical Stress for: Defamation of Personal and Professional 
Character. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of this document read: "9. On or around 
the 15th of August, 1994, Sharon Hencky, investigator for the EEOC contacted 
Plaintiff to respond to Defendant's charges of: 1) treating client in an 
uncaring, dangerous manner; 2) filthy, unkemp appearance; 3) insubordin-
ation; 4) substandard performance; 5) poor interpersonal relationships. 
10. Since Plaintiff had not heard these charges or the half truths or out-
right lies that had been used to support these charges before, Plaintiff 
was thrown into severe emotional stress that ocntributed to an acute episode 
of diverticulitis that landed Plaintiff in Logan HOspital for nine days. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants for defamation of 
personal and professional character leading to: 1) loss of employment; 
2) loss of professional reputation; 3) loss of personal reputation; 4) 
severe physical and emotional stress; the sum of $3,000,000 (three million 
dollars), (page 3) 
It is to be assumed that Mr. O'Brien is familiar with the State Consti-
tution and knows that libelous testimony needs to be truthful, published for 
good motives and a justifiable end since he is a lawyer. He deliberately 
led Judge Frederick believe that false testimony is protected by privilege, 
(page 39,193) 
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Memorandum 
TO: File 
FROM: SH 
RE: T. Thompson vs Community Nursing Services 
Charge No. 35C-94-0115 
A On August 19/ 1994, during a telephone interview# Colleen 
2• Hollenbeck (DOB 4-13-59), former Nurse Manager and CP's witness, 
£,stated the following: 
y. She had hired CP. She stated that the reason CP was hired was her 
1^ life's experience, in lieu of the fact she had little nursing 
^experience. Ms. Hollenbeck thought that with experience and in-
7house training, CP would do just fine. CP struggled with h^r job 
^.duties from the very start of her employment. Her main probl^TH yg,g 
frthe_ability to get along with patients. CP#s job was to go to 
^patient's homes and provide whatever'"^are was necessary. Many 
//complaints were received about CP's attitude and way of handling 
/2-these patients. She was counseled on several occasions. After 
/7-CP's first counseling session with* Susan Morgan, CP stated that 
yVSusan pointed out wrong things. CP persistently argued about the 
/^content of what Susan was trying to relate to CP. When Ms. 
/^Hollenbeck restated what Morgan had initially said, CP seemed to 
^understand what had gone on and why she had been counseled* CP 
/^never used the work "harassed" when speaking about her treatment by 
/£Morgan* it was mostly about performance issues. Ms. Hollenbeck 
^stated that Morgan was responsible for the highest risk patients 
«2*. (IV), and errors could be life-threatening. Morgan had to address 
^deficiencies to employees. Most employees, including CP, did not 
^like to hear what Morgan said. Ms. Hollenbeck stated that she had 
2^never personally observed anyone, including Morgan, harassing CP or 
^anyone else. Ms. Hollenbeck only had second hand knowledge about 
Xthe incidents leading up to CP's termination, but did state that 
£7they could have been very serious. 
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Memorandum 
TOs File 
FROM: SH 
REs T. Thompson vs Community Nursing Services 
Charge No. 35C-94-0115 
On August 19, 1994, during a telephone interview, Lona Booth (DOB 
5-30-39), Weekend Supervisor and CP#s witness, stated the 
following: 
She said CF was a paradox - she had the appearance of a bag lady 
and was fairly intellectual on the other hand. From the very 
start^jshe^had received many complaints about CP from patientg^and 
pther stafl:, and had counseled CP on these complainfes. Except for 
the complaints, CP did 'a good ioh* although she was one of R's 
lesser qualified nurses. CP had had minimum prior working 
experience and only had an associate degree in nursing, while most 
other nurses had bachelors degrees in nursing and many years of 
experience. CP trang^rred to her weekend team in December 199L, 
after CP had complained to her about her then supervisor, Susan 
Morgan. CP's complaint had stemmed from a warning she had received 
for poor job performance. CP did not use the work "harassment", 
but did say that Ms. Morgan, did not treat her fairly. After 
talking to CP, Ms. Booth said that CP's main complaints were about 
Ms. Morgan's style of supervision. Morgan was responsible for the 
most critical ill patients and had to see that employees were 
performing their duties, such as IV' s, properly. She is an 
assertive person who will confront any situation head-on, and 
expects a great deal from her workers. She treats all employees 
the same way, fair or not. At the end of their conversation, Ms. 
Booth said that CP seemed to understand why she had received the 
warning, but said that she did not like hearing it from Ms. Morgan. 
Ms. Booth stated that no one else had complained about harassment 
from anyone in the ten years she had been employed by the 
Respondent, although she had heard employees grumble on occasion 
about Susan Morgan being too strict and expected too much of 
employees. 
Regarding the last two incidents, Ms. Booth stated that they were 
both potentially very dangerous situations which could have been 
avoided. Regarding the second event, she stated that CP had gone 
to a patients home and had found that the equipment was not working 
properly. She did not know how to fix what was wrong, and left 
without calling for assistance. When Ms. Booth had found out what 
had happened the next week, CP told her that a "big to-do11 was made 
out of the situation, and that she (CP) refused to see any more IV 
patients in the future. Ms. Booth regarded this statement as 
insubordination. No one else had ever done anything similar. CP 
had also missed a mandatory training which would have given her the 
expertise in repairing the equipment problem. 
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Page 4 
Response to Charge and Request for Information 
Theresa F. Thompson, 35C940115 
On or about December, 1991, Ms. Thompson submitted an internal 
'application requesting she be^  considered for weeXend^d^xZIlSBZwas 
accepLt^ dc The position was regarded as full-time and was fully 
benefited. It stipulated that she be available to work every 
Friday at 12 Noon through the following Monday at 12 noon. Skills 
required of this position included proficiency in IV teaching and 
administration, excellence in assessment skills, and organizational 
skills to adequately coordinate delivery of care on the weekends. 
Eventually, due to lack of need, Ms. Thompson only worked JSatjurday 
ajld^ Sunday. This was the shift she was working at the time of her 
termination in March, 1993. 
Proficiency in intravenous administration (IV) and teaching is 
required of all weekend staff members. Our policy is that alLJUL. 
team members must pass a yearly examination on IV therapy. The IV 
Certification Pass-Off includes a written test, central line care, 
blood draw from central line, types of IV lines, mock IV and use of 
various IV equipment, such as Bard Infusion Pump, and TPN infusion. 
Ms. Thompson participated in and passed the examination on May 15, 
1991 and May 6, 1992c 
Additional educational inservices were routinely provided on site 
for professional development of Ms. Thompson and all other nurses 
required to perform IV therapy, usually on a monthly basis. Some 
of the inservices which were made available included: 
Chemotherapy 3-4-92 
Infusion of Pain Medications 3-6-92 
TPN Update 10-2-92 
Epidural Catheters 10-7-92 
Ms. Thompson attended the first two inservices, but opted not to 
attend the last two. In fact, one of the incidents for which Ms. 
Thompson was discharged involved improper progrjyroming^f^ 
infusing TPN to a patient, an inservice which slie did not attend. 
Ms. Thompson had a history of staff and patient complaints for 
which she was counseled. Written counseling occurred on 5-3-91, 
in which a patient requested that Ms. Thompson be taken off the 
case, and 1-29-92 for a patient complaint that she caused a 
"stressful" visit due to the way she set up a glucometer machine. 
Performance reviews on 4-11-91 indicated Ms, Thompson needed to 
"Increase knowledge of home health necessary in personal prac±jLc.eLy!_^ . 
8-20-92 indicated she needed to "increase, pg-qpgqmpni° glHll,^  and 
a dmitpaperwo rk". — 
Verbal complaints from staff to Ms. Thompsonfs supervisors included 
concern about her assessment skills and also regarding her 
appearance, which was often dirty and unkempt. One of her 
supervisors, Susan Morgan, has record of verbal counseling for 
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Response to Charge and Request for Information 
Theresa F„ Thompson, 35C940115 
DISCHARGE: 
The decision to terminate Ms. Thompson's employment was reached 
after careful review of the following: 
Pyior work experience 
Current jnh desnri pfci QJ\ 
CNS & H training specifically regarding IVs and TPN 
CNS & H counseling history concerning staff and patient 
complaints 
Incident reports completed regarding two patients 
on 3-13-93 and 3-14-93 
The level of skill and judgment exercised on 3-13-93 and 3-14-93 
was not appropriate and could have resulted in serious consequences 
for those patients. 
The first incident on 3-13-93 involved a blood draw from a man who 
had an IV. Ms. Thompson drew the blood from an IV line which was 
infusing the drug Heparin. The fact that Ms. Thompson would draw 
blood from an IV line was extremely unusual in the first place. An 
excerpt from the CNS & H IV Certification Outline which Ms. 
Thompson read and passed specifically states, "Blood draws from an 
IV line are not recommended. . .PT and PTT's should not be drawn from 
a line". Because traces of the drug were still in the line, the 
blood sample readings turned out to be very strange. The concerned 
physician ordered this home bound patient to go to the emergency 
room for a blood draw, where the blood tests proved to be normal. 
While not lif e-threatening^ this event caused considerab le 
inconvenience for the patJLent. Additionally, the patient's 
physician was so angry over the error that he assigned the patient 
to another home health agency. To this day, he refuse^ to refer 
his patients to CNS & H^ _ 
The second, and most serious incident involved a woman who had 
several health problems, including pancreatitis. One of the 
treatments for her condition involved giving her Total Parental 
Nutrition (TPN) intravenously through a pancreatic pump. No other 
nutrients are given. It is important to understand that if the 
pump was not programmed correctly, the infusion of nutrients could 
stop abruptly causing her blood sugar to drop dramatically, leaving 
her vulnerable to a hypoglycemic incident. The patient could have 
slipped into a coma and died. 
Ms. Thompson had seen the patient on 3-13-93, and had noted on_th^ 
chart that the patientfs blood sugar was low and unstable.^ The 
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V
 W* 1-1-92-
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE 
INCIDENT REPORT 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVED! PATIENT INVOLVED? 
Name; /^WiM ^/Zss-^t^Mj* ^ Name % y Q/SJL X^t<^c 
Address :J_ Address : /<#// ij&id&g/j ^ . 
Phone: Phone :. 
Employee t s&l/ F I D # « _ _ _ _ _ ^ 2 _ _ _ -
<HN,PT, A i d e , e t c . ) 
OTHERS INVOLVED: Name: Phone\ 
Address : R e l a t i o n s h i p 
DATE OF INCIDENT; ////?.?> /TIME OF INCIDENT: • /z?3Q 
LOCATION OF INCIDENTS 3 W ^ &**?/.,?(!. Jtfa-m . 
INCIDENT REPORTED TO; ^/l/ssrtsn ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T l M E t / 3 5 4 DATE; //?/*^ 
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT; (Complete o t h e r s i d e of, form i f i n d u s t r i a l 
UxV"^ • ^ gik* /y[jLUL^ l-4Jj**«- ^tt ate* do*J hd b%»* 61 ~ 
Employee s i g n a t u r e 
• a^T <r^ 
•QLLOW-UP 
'amily aware of incident; lAa<> 
'hysician aware of incident: U / - o 
. c t i on t a k e n / I n d u s t r i a l r e p o r t : -
o l l o w - u p / S u p e r v i s o r ' s Comments:^ \\JJ^,<A/yu±*-*4 v*O-£0 CAJJ 0 ^ \ 
WS-363 <-/VWuJLe6«( / w ^ . /*» C«C-«^ »-M < ^ Sr*"^ 0^-vA. #^68di>-
'89 ^ 0 . 1 o V 
AM; r 
CNS 
Oat^TICATION/ODMPLAINr FCRM 
Date !/3?)fc> 
Information Given By: fictAJ^yiSWI /,U£&J * , Patient Y 
Information Received By: J/KOU < % * 7 / n ^ , 
Name ' V 
Job T i t l e O 
Mature of Communication: 
bars kXJ-U/V ^ ' 
Action Taken/Followup: 
7/7/ . /yrtesnU&A-^l^ sUrr-AiAs d&O-*^*)^ 
JZ. 
ame of Person Completing Followup date (-£=-
CNS 
GOMJINigOTCN/OT^yuniJTJJOTl 
>ata u - !<?; s*>-
iiformation Given By: cdL(WsJUP V - g g < f ) b 0 l ^ o Patient <,/ 
Name Staff 
Other 
^formation Received By: r>jL_/OW ifr'HjCnC; 
Name 
Job Title 
ature of Gomnunication: 
it  <3 
S p J k f l ^ S i g y t ^ l g C r W ^ ^ O v l l U ^ C7 TK O 
'J^^CAJUJ / U ^ A ^ N ^ o . , ^ njo^s Aiflo/ IW?^)( g? y\JflX>Q-i 
NOA^^JLftyXnp^^ d^ yvA \**A Jhth i t U SlfXh^ . fUe-rl 
&^ U> Jk^o g*£L* M^^ S^i rJLM JU dfadds 
tion Taken/Followupi 
• ^ X ^ - u e - ^ ( J ^ r Q i 2 ^ L Oi^Jh^p 
e of Person Ccrapleting Followup Date 
Le: 
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Also Mr. O'Brien, being a lawyer, would have recognized the Tort of 
Outrage for what it was inspite of the fact that it was not properly named by 
Plaintiff. He refused to quote it, and always insisted it tried to create 
a defamation liability, (page 38, 88, 120, 136) Plaintiff contends that this 
effort to mislead the Court is a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct 
3o3 (a 1, 4) 
Mr. O'Brien's first attempt to subvert the Plaintiff's charges and mis-
lead the judge in violation of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 1, 4) and 
Section 78-51-26(4) (Duties of Attorneys and Counselors) was in Motion to 
Dismiss/and or for Summary Judgment (page 37), quote: The basis for this 
Motion is that Plaintiff seeks to assert a defamation claim for statements 
made..." He further subverted the claim in the Memorandum—quote: "Plaintiff's 
pro se Complaint (undated and Amended Complaint (dated 10/19/94) expressly 
assert that Plaintiff was defamed by statements allegedly made by CNS/H..." 
(page 38) 
The Amended Complaint added to the Pro Se Complaint a charge that Plaintiff 
had been defamed by Defendant. However, the Plaintiff's pro se Complaint 
did not assert that Plaintiff had been defamed by statements made by Defendant 
but did expressly charge severe emotional and physical harm caused by false 
testimony ( a violation of Utah Code Ann.Sec. 76-8-502, 76-8-503, and 76-8-504) 
(page 38) 
Defendant's lawyer continues the deception on page 2 of Memorandum—quote: 
"Plaintiff plainly seeks to impose defamation liability..." (page 39) and 
he clearly ignores the charge of severe emotional and physical harm. 
Plaintiff at this time was still under the impression that the lawyer 
also meant false testimony by 'defamation'. 
Mr. O'Brien, in using absolute privilege as a defense, deliberately 
eliminated that portion of the definition of absolute privilege (Black's 
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Law Dictionary) that says —quote: "(absolute) privilege...protects the 
speaker or publisher without reference to his motives or the truth or falsity 
of statement. This may be claimed in respect to statements made in legis-
lative debates, in reports of military officers to their superiors in the line 
of duty, and statements made by judges, witnesses, and jurors in trials in 
court. (It does not cover the litigants.)...based on the fact that the state-
ment was made in the performance of a political, judicial, social or personal 
duty...privileges created by law irrespective of consent...arise where there 
is some important and overriding social value in sanctioning defendant's 
conduct, despite the fact that it causes plaintiff harm." By not reavealing 
this information to the Court, Defendant's lawyer was in violation of Rules 
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (a 2). There was no overriding social value 
in the false testimony presented by Defendant nor was the false testimony 
given as a matter of duty. It was totally self-serving and meant to manipu-
late a federal commission in the line of its duty. The statement did not 
promote public welfare in any way. If CNS/H goes out of business, there are 
other home nursing agencies to fill the void. 
By definition absolute privilege protects statements made in judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceedings in the line of duty and have an overriding 
social value from libel liability. However, Mr. O'Brien deceitfully led 
Court to believe absolute privilege also protected from harm caused by the 
false testimony and criminal charges, (page 135-136) 
Mr. O'Brien further attempted to mislead the Court about the main issue 
of the EEOC investigation. The lawyer claimed that the main issue was Plain-
tiff's termination of employment (page 42) which it was not. The main issue 
was a two-year history of harrassment and retaliation, (pages 67-73). 
When Mr. O'Brien finally accepted the fact that there was itideed a tort 
of outrage, he insisted that it was created around the end of December, (page 136) 
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when in fact it was the Original Complaint (page 2). His defense again at-
tempted to deceive the Court into believing that the Tort was really only an 
attempt "to impose liability for absolutely privileged statements." (page 136) 
and that the stress was created by termination of employment which is not con-
sidered outrageous, (page 137). In the Pro Se Complaint it clearly states 
that the stress that hospitalized the Plaintiff was caused by false testimony 
which Plaintiff learned about nearly a year and a half after termination of 
employment. Deliberately presenting false testimony to a federal commission 
in the performance of its duty to manipulate a decision is outrageous conduct. 
Mr. O'Brien consistently and persistantly used arguments that were aimed 
at deceiving and misleading the judge. He consistantly used partial defi'-
nitions, conpared judicial proceeding to the EEOC proceeding (there is no 
comparison. Plaintiff filed the charge with EEOC but was not required to send 
a copy to the Defendant. Plaintiff did not hear from the EEOC again for eight 
months when the investigator was ready to make a decision. Plaintiff was un-
able to get a copy of Defendant's response until and for the exclusive use 
of a Civil suit. There are no procedural rules or mechanism in place to insure 
a fair and just determination. 
Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court to find Mr. O'Brien guilty of 
professional misconduct, guilty of violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 78-51-31-
Plaintiff holds Mr. O'Brien and his employers (JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH) equally responsible for my month of severe physical and mental 
harm and ask $36,000,000 (thirty-six million dollars) in relief. 
********************************************* 
4. Argument in support of misconduct of Judge Frederick. 
Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 2 A. A judge shall respect and comply 
with the law and should exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in 
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in the integrity and impartiality of judiciary. 
Canon 3.B (4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to 
litigants... 
Canon 3. B (5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or 
prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, 
by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudece...A judge should be alert to 
behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
Canon 3. B (7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally 
interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full right to be heard 
according to law. 
Canon 3. B (8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, 
efficiently, and fairly. 
Attached are two affidavits attesting to violation by Judge Frederick 
of the above mentioned Canons. 
Plaintiff further charges that Judge J. Dennis Frederick violated Canon 3 
B (5) when he issued a minute order granting Defendant's request to deny 
Plaintiff's Post-judgment orders. The request was two days late. Judge 
Frederick granted the request before Plaintiff even had a copy of it. He 
also signed the order before Plaintiff had filed her reply. Defendant's 
Request was filed January 11, 1995; Minute Entry was made the 12th; Order 
was signed the 13th. Plaintiff Objected to judge's hasty decision on 13th. 
Judge set aside the minute entry of the 12th—stated he Misunderstood Defendant's 
argument* 0*i January 26, 1995 he found in Defendant's favor based on Defendant's 
arguments. Between January 11, 1995 (Defendant's arguments misunderstood by 
judge) and January 26, 1995 there were no new arguments presented by Defendant. 
The judge's decision on January 26, 1995 were based on the same arguments that 
he claimed to have misunderstood on January 18, 1995! (pa8e 1 34, 141» 143, 148, 
149, 150, 154). 
Plaintiff charges that Judge Frederick never read any of Plaintiff's 
A O 
charges or arguments and his attitude towards Plaintiff was a violation of 
Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Supreme Court investigate this 
matter and take appropriate action. 
******************************************************* 
******************************************************* 
10. Relief sought: An equitable decision about the EEOC that will 
prevent future situations like the one Plaintiff found herself in, and 
$12,000,000 from the Defendant for the severe harm they caused to Plaintiff 
by their flagrant violation of the law. Plaintiff also asks $36,000,000 from 
JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K AND McDONOUGH Law Firm for their involvement in the 
harm caused to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asks that a decision or clarificatio 
be made giving precedence to Constitutional law and statuatory law over 
common law when there, is a conflict between the two. Plaintiff further 
asks $2,000,000 for the harm caused to Plaintiff's reputation by the 
Defendant's false testimony- Plaintiff requests all legal fees and damages 
paid by Defendant. 
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PLAINTIFF REPRESENTING SELF 
BOX 786 
PARK VALLEY, UTAH 84329 
NO PHONE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT AFFIRMING OPENING STATEMENT 
BY DEFENDANT'S LAWYER AND GENERAL AT-
TITUDE OF COURT 
TO BE FILED WITH CIVIL CASE 
Civil No. 940906495 CV 
Appellate No. 950102 
I, William M. Thompson, being over 21 years of age and of sound mind 
and body, do solemnly affirm that the following statement is a true and 
accurate account of what transpired at the court hearing on December 12, 1994 
between Theresa F. Thompson (my mother) and Community Nursing Service/Hospice: 
I was'sitting towards the back of the courtroom. Mr. O'Brien (defendant's 
lawyer), as he approached the podium, said that they did not contest the charge's 
but could not be held accountable for them and gave his argument. I do not 
remember his exact words. I have read the transcript of Mr. O'Brien's statement 
and it does not agree with what I heard. Since I was farther from Mr. O'Brien 
than either the judge or the recorder, it is assumed that they also heard what 
I heard. 
During the entire time Mrs. Thompson was talking, Judge Frederick sat 
tapping a pen or pencil on his table, flipping papers and occasionally writing. 
He seldom looked in Mrs. Thompson direction and I got the impression he was 
totally bored by the whole proceeding, also that he had made up his mind about 
the case before the hearing had ever started. 
After the hearing I told Mrs. Thompson that from what I had observed not 
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to be surprised if Mr. O'Brien's opening statement did not appear in the 
transcript of if Judge Frederick found against her. I also told her that if 
she wanted or needed, I would testify in court as to what I had seen and heard, 
She didn't think that would be necessary. She really believed that because 
Mr. O'Brien had said what he did, that it would appear in the transcript. She 
also believed that if she lost the case, it would be because she had presented 
her case badly, not because of bias on the part of the judge. 
I was there as a witness to whatever transpired, but also to try and 
prevent whatever might transpire from causing my mother so much stress that 
she wound up in the hospital again. My mother finally realized that this 
testimony was necessary when she tried to have the transcript corrected and 
the judge refused to have it corrected even when Mr. O'Brien did not deny 
saying it. His only argument was that Mrs. Thompson misunderstood him. I 
did not misunderstand him, and neither did Mrs. Thompson. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT AFFIRMING OPENING STATEMENT 
OF DEFENDANT'S LAWYER AND GENERAL AT-
TITUDE OF COURT 
TO BE FILED WITH CIVIL CASE 
Civil No. 940906495 CV 
Appellate No. 950102 
I, Theresa F. Thompson, being over 21 years of age and of sound mind 
and body, do solemnly affirm that the following statement is a true and 
accurate account of what transpired at the court hearing on December 12, 1994 
between Theresa F. Thompson and Community Nursing Service/Hospice: 
I was sitting alone at the Plaintiff's table. Mr. O'Brien, Defendant's 
lawyer, arose from his seat and approached the podium. As he walked to the 
podium, he quietly said, "We do not contest the charges. We admit them." 
He placed his papers on the podium and proceeded to read from them his argument 
as to why CNS/H should not be held accountable for its actions. 
After Mr. O'Brien completed his argument and sat down, I went to the 
podium to give my argument as to why CNS/H should be held accountable for 
their actions. I looked at the judge and he was sorting through some papers 
that were on his desk. I thought it was my responsibility to get his attention. 
I started to talk but was already confused and realing under the Defendant's 
admission of guilt. I looked up at the judge again and he was tapping a pen 
on his desk, but he was looking towards me. I continued talking, but getting 
more and more flustered. He looked away and I knew I had lost his attention. 
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THERESA F. THOMPSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
COMMUNITY NURSING SERVICE/HOSPICE, 
Defendant. 
Throughout the balance of my argument the judge seemed to be occupied 
with his papers and pen. I sensed impatience from him and felt it was because 
of my poor presentation which got worse by the minute as I became more and 
more frustrated. Finally at the end of the hearing after the Defendant had 
made their final statement, 1 asked the judge if I could present some other 
evidence that had not been brought out in any previous written statement* (I 
didn't know what could or couldn't be used as evidence.) The judge asked, 
"Is it going to take long?" I said no, and hurried through the presentation. 
I did not know until after I filed the appeal with the Supreme Court and 
continued my research in the Utah Codes that the judge's attitude towards me 
was a violation of the Code of Judicial Administration (Canons 1 and 3). 
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